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I. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFICT: PARTICIPANTS,
PROcESS AND PURPOSES
NTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT is a situation
characterized by relatively intense degrees of violence con-
ducted by States and other participants including organized resis-
tance movements. The international humanitarian law of armed
conflict, traditionally known as the law of war, is designed to
impose limitations upon the conduct of such violence. To the ex-
tent that the law is effective, a situation of international armed
conflict becomes a system of controlled coercion. That violence
which is an end in itself (perhaps designed to satisfy the patho-
logical cravings of its perpetrators) is prohibited by the law.
The urgent need for limitations in an era characterized by massive
governmental methods of warfare and guerrilla methods con-
ducted by all participants, with the ensuing inadequate protection
of noncombatants, should not require an elaborate academic argu-
ment.
The doctrinal or normative elements in the law of armed
conflict are better understood and honored when perceived in the
context of the juridical decision-making process of which they are
an indispensable part. In the present decentralized system of in-
ternational law, this includes subsidiary processes of factual inter-
action, claim and counter-claim, and authoritative decision. The
fact that national state officials perform a double function as both
claimants and decision-makers places them in a network of mu-
tualities and reciprocities which promotes compliance with the
doctrinal standards. Stated negatively, a national official who ad-
vances claims and makes decisions not justified in law is likely
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to find subsequently that his actions are utilized by others to
harm his own important national interests.'
The effective sanctioning and enforcement of the law of armed
conflict, like that of other branches of international law and of
municipal law, is dependent in large measure for its observance
upon the common interests of the participants. 2 The group par-
ticipants include States and their typically regular armed forces,
and organized resistance movements and their typically irregular
armed forces. If the law is to be effective in imposing restraints
upon these groups, it must provide inducements to bring their in-
dividual combatants within the juridical decision-making process.3
The futility of attempting to put irregular combatants outside the
law is illustrated by the barbaric methods employed against them
during the Second World War by the Nazis and the Japanese
militarists. 4 Torture and the death penalty were demonstrated to
be failures as deterrent sanctions to prevent resistance by irregu-
lar forces. The central technique which has been cmployed thus
far with some measure of success is an interrelated system of
rights and duties. The rights may be exercised conditioned upon
compliance with the duties. More specifically, both regular and
irregular combatants who comply with the legal criteria, including
the central criterion of adherence to the laws and customs of war,
are entitled to exercise controlled violence while they are militar-
ily effective and to have the legally privileged status of prisoners
of war (P.O.W.s) upon capture.5
Historically, not everyone was entitled to the status of a legal-
ly privileged combatant. The ideas associated with knighthood
and chivalry in Western Europe limited such combatant status
to a military caste who participated in public, as opposed to pri-
vate, wars.6 A public war was one avowed or declared by a
prince for governmental or state ends.7  In contrast, hostilities
I A systematic presentation of the decision-making process appears in M.
McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE
LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION ch. 1 (1961).
2 W. MALLISON, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: SUBMARINES IN
GENERAL AND LIMITED WARS 19 (U.S. Naval War C., Int'l L. Stud., 1966).
3See Aldrich, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: Development of the Law, 68
DEP'T STATE BULL. 876, 880 (1973).
4 See Judgment in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 1 INT'L MIL. TRIB. 226-38 (Off. Eng. text, 1947).
s See J. DE PREUX, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA PRISONERS OF WAR CONVEN-
TION OF 1949, at 46-47 (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, J. Pictet ed. 1960) [herein-
after cited as I.C.R.C.].
6 M. KEEN, THE LAWS OF WAR IN THE LATE MIDDLE AGES 82-100 (1965).
7 Id. at 72. A summary of the medieval historical background appears in
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for private purposes were typically characterized by acts of murder
and plunder with noncombatants as the main objects of attack.
The contemporary relevance of these conceptions is manifested by
the criteria which are presently imposed upon regulars and irregu-
lars alike. The requirements that all privileged combatants act
for a public purpose and that violence for private gain (the acts of
marauders on land or pirates at sea) is prohibited are as funda-
mental today as. they have been historically.8
Guerrilla warfare is a factual method or technique of exercis-
ing violence and not a legal concept. It may be conceived em-
pirically as a type of warfare characterized by the use of unortho-
dox tactics including stealth, surprise, and shock, whether con-
ducted by regular armed forces (commandos, rangers, special
forces, and so on) or by irregular armed forces including. organized
resistance movements. 9  Regular armed forces may, in particu-
lar contexts, conduct guerrilla warfare by choice, while irregular
forces frequently conduct it by necessity. The creation of irregu-
lar armed forces has been historically associated with a basic sense
of injustice which is sometimes combined with a politically persua-
sive ideology. The political preferences connected with irregular
violence or counter-violence have produced diverse approaches to
juridical analysis. 1°
Draper, The Status of Combatants and the Question of Guerilla Warfare, 45 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 173-77 (1973).
s Mallison and Jabri, The Juridical Characteristics of Belligerent Occupation and
the Resort to Resistance by the Civilian Population: Doctrinal Development and Con-
tinuity, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 185, 216-19 and passim (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Belli. Occupation]. For an analysis which ignores the criteria of the Brussels
Declaration, Hague Regulations, and Geneva P.O.W. Convention concerning
privileged irregular combatants and makes no significant distinction between
such combatants and pirates see REISMAN, Private Armies in a Global War Sys-
tem: Prologue to Decision, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 252
(J. N. Moore ed., 1974).
9 The factual and analytical material on the subject is large. See, e.g., R.
TABER, THE WAR OF THE FLEA (1970); R. THOMPSON, DEFEATING COMMUNIST
INSURGENCY (1966); J. B. BELL, THE MYTH OF THE GUERRILLA (1971); CHE
GUEVARA, GUERRILLA WARFARE (Morray transl., 1961); PHILOSOPHY OF THE URBAN
GUERRILLA: THE REVOLUTIONARY WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM GuILLEN (Hodges transl.
and ed., 1973); B. B. FALL, STREET WITHOUT JOY (Schocken Books, 1972).
10 The Soviet post-World War II view appears in Trainin, Questions of Guer-
rilla Warfare in the Law of War, 40 AM J. INT'L L. 535 (1946). The Government
of Israel view appears in T. MERON, SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARAB TERRORISTS'
CLAIMS TO PRIVILEGED COMBATANCY (Sabra Books, 1970). The Government of
the Republic of South Africa view is reflected in Booysen, Terrorists, Prisoners
of War and South Africa, 1 S.AFR. Y.B. INT'L L. 14 (1975). A Third World per-
spective appears in Abi-Saab, Wars of National Liberation and the Laws of War, 3
ANNALS INT'L STUDIES 93 (1972). Concern about Third World perspectives is
manifested in Graham, The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on the Law of War: A
[Vol. 9: 39
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It should be clear that the elimination of international armed
conflict in the present highly interdependent world community is
the preeminent public order goal. The more modest, but over-
riding, legal policy objective of the law of armed conflict is the
minimization of the destruction of human and material values."
This requires a delimitation of military objectives and the protec-
tion of noncombatants as far as possible, even in combat situa-
tions. It also requires realistic juridical doctrines which can be
applied in the real world of international armed conflict.
This analysis focuses on the contemporary international law
criteria applicable to irregular combatants and their ensuing status
in law. An analysis of the law concerning regulars will be made
where it is relevant to the main subject. Other combatants, such
as spies, saboteurs, and the irregulars who do not meet the ap-
plicable criteria of the law of armed conflict, are lawful comba-
tants in particular contexts, but they are not entitled to the priv-
ileged treatment of P.O.W.s upon capture. 12 This category of
unprivileged combatants whose activities are not prohibited by in-
ternational law is considered where it provides context for the
subject under consideration.
II. THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION (1874)
The Brussels Conference of 1874, the first multilateral con-
ference to consider the law of land warfare, met at the invitation
of the Russian Czar. The Declaration produced at this Confer-
ence has been accorded little attention by legal scholars because
it remained unratified. It comprises, nevertheless, the foundation
upon which the modern law of land warfare has been built. Prior
to the meeting of the First Hague Conference in 1899, the con-
sensus of the Brussels Conference was widely accepted as the
authoritative statement of the customary law on the subject.13
During the Franco-Prussian War, the Prussian Government
had acted on the assumption that only those irregulars having
Victory for Political Causes and a Return to the 'Just War" Concept of the Eleventh
Century, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 25 (1975), responded to in Bond, Amended
Article I of Draft Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions: The Coming of Age of
the Guerrilla, id. at 65.
11 The basic character of this objective is explained in McDOUGAL & FELICI-
ANO, supra note 1, at 59-93 passim.
12 Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas, and Sabo-
teurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323 (1951); Belli. Occupation, supra note 8, at 199-200.
13 See, e.g., 1 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 16-17
(1920); A. P. HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR 258 (1909).
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state authorization were entitled to privileged combatant status.
Consequently, each franc-tireur who could not produce a special
authorization from the French Government upon capture was exe-
cuted. Remembering these events, the Russian Government pro-
posed in Article 9 of the original draft project to grant the status
of privileged belligerents to militia and volunteers not forming
part of the regular army provided that they met specified re-
quirements including adherence to the laws and customs of war
and, additionally, provided that they were subject to orders from
army headquarters. Failing these requirements, it was stated
that they shall not have privileged status and "in case of capture
shall be proceeded against judicially."14 The Conference, consis-
tent with the strong convictions of the minor military powers,
however, adopted the following modified text of Article 9:
The laws, rights, and duties of war are applicable not only
to the army, but likewise to militia and corps of volunteers
complying with the following conditions:
1. That they have at their head a person responsible for
his subordinates;
2. That they wear some settled distinctive badge recogniz-
able at a distance;
3. That they carry arms openly; and
4. That, in their operations, they conform to the laws and
customs of war.
In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part
of it, they are included under the denomination army.
The introductory wording which sets forth the well-established
principle that the "laws, rights, and duties of war are applicable"
to the regular army was merely declaratory of the existing cus-
tomary law. The new juridical concept is the provision which
applies the same rights and obligations to militia and volunteers
if they comply with the specified four conditions: (1) military
command; (2) distinctive badge; (3) open arms; (4) conformity to
the laws and customs of war. These four fundamental criteria,
which are equally applicable to regulars, have been repeateo in
14 Record of the Brussels Conference of 1874, PARL. PAPERS, Misc. No. 1
(G.B. 1975). For the Russian draft-project and the final approved text of the
Brussels Declaration with a summary of the discussions that preceded the ap-
proval of each section, see 65 BRIT. & FOR. STATE PAPERS 1871-1874, at 1067-1109
(1881). The Final Protocol and the [Final] Project of an International Decla-
ration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War [hereinafter cited as the Brus-
sels Declaration] appear in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS: A COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 25-34 (Schindler & Toman
eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Schindler & Toman]. Articles 2 and 3 of the
Oxford Manual adopted by the Institute of International Law at Oxford, Sept. 9,
1880, adopted the four criteria of-Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration. Id. at 35,
37.
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Hague Convention II of 1899 as well as in Hague Convention IV
of 1907 and the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949.
In addition to its omission of the requirement of subjection to
orders from army headquarters, a most significant feature of Ar-
ticle 9 as adopted was its lack of a provision requiring state
authorization for irregular forces. The result was an unequivocal
rejection of the treatment of French irregulars by the Prussian
Government.
III. THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE
(1899 AND 1907)
The Brussels Declaration was signed by the representatives
of all of the states participating in the Conference, but since it
was not ratified by their respective governments, it did not be-
come binding as a multilateral treaty. At the Hague Conference
of 1899, this Declaration was taken as the starting point concern-
ing the law of land warfare.15
Both the 1899 Convention II with Respect to the Laws and
Customs of War on Land* and the 1907 Convention IVt em-
ployed a form which included a preamble, a body of the Conven-
tion containing important administrative matters, and regulations
annexed to the Convention containing the substantive rules of
land warfare. Article 1 of the 1899 and the 1907 Annexed Regu-
lations specified the criteria for irregulars to have privileged sta-
tus in identical wording. This Article, with minor changes in
wording, reproduces the substance of Article 9 of the Brussels
Declaration and includes the four criteria of military command,
distinctive sign, open arms, and adherence to the laws and cus-
toms of war. Consistent with the Brussels Declaration, there is
no requirement of state authorization for irregular combatants.
Article 1 adds explicit multilateral agreement to the customary
consensus appearing in Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration.
During the two World Wars, the identical Article 1 of the 1899
and 1907 Hague Regulations provided the governing law concern-
ing the criteria to be met by irregular combatants in order for
them to qualify for the privileged treatment of P.O.W.s.
15 See statement of Mr. De Martens, the Russian delegate, at the 1899 Hague
Conference, quoted in Belli. Occupation, supra note 8, at 200, n.65.
* Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land [and Annexed Regulations], July 29, 1899, [1932] 32 Stat. 1803, T.S.
No. 403, II Malloy 2042 [hereinafter cited as Hague Regs. (1899)].
t Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land [and Annexed Regulations], Oct. 18, 1907, [1910] 36 Stat. 2277, T.S.
No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 [hereinafter cited as Hague Regs.].
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The practice of the Nazis and the Japanese militarists was,
nevertheless, to refuse to accord privileged combatant status to
irregular guerrillas or partisans without regard to whether they
complied with Article 1. The post-World War II war crimes
trials held that the killing of irregulars who complied with Article
1, rather than according them P.O.W. status, was a war crime.
In United States v. Ohlendorf,16 the U.S. Military Tribunal, after
quoting Article 1, stated:
Many of the defendants seem to assume that by merely char-
acterizing a person a partisan, he may be shot out of hand. But
it is not so simple as that. If the partisans are organized and
are engaged in what international law regards as legitimate war-
fare for the defense of their own country, they are entitled to be
protected as combatants.
The language used in the official German reports, received
in evidence in this case, show, however, that [irregular] com-
batants were indiscriminately punished only for having fought
against the enemy. This is contrary to the law of war.17
Professor Lauterpacht has thoughtfully summarized the law
of the Hague Regulations which was applicable in both World
Wars:
Of such irregular forces two different kinds are to be dis-
tinguished - first, such as are acting on their own initiative, and
on their own account, without special authorisation. Formerly,
it was a recognised rule of International Law that only the mem-
bers of authorised irregular forces enjoyed the privileges due to
the members of the armed forces of belligerents . . . . But ac-
cording to Article 1 of the Hague Regulations this rule is now
obsolete. Its place is taken by the rule that irregulars enjoy the
privileges due to members of the armed forces of the bellig-
erents, although they do not act under authorisation . . . s
Article 2 of the 1899 and 1907 Annexed Regulations deals
with the mass levy - that is, the situation of inhabitants who take
up arms spontaneously upon the approach of the invader. The
1899 Regulations require only that such inhabitants respect the
laws and customs of war, whereas the 1907 Regulations require
that they also carry arms openly. The requirements for mass
levies to enjoy privileged combatant status omit the two additional
requirements for other irregular combatants. 19
16 "The Einsatzgruppen Case," 4 U.S. TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. 1 (1949).
17 Id. at 492, 493.
18 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: DISPUTES, WAR AND NEUTRALITY
256-57 (7th ed., H. Lauterpacht 1952).
19 See text accompanying notes 78-79 infra.
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A third category of "belligerents" - that is, combatants - is
referred to in the Preamble to the 1899 and 1907 Conventions on
Land Warfare. The famous De Martens clause, named for its
author, the principal Russian delegate, appeared in the Preamble
to each of the Conventions and was worded this way in the 1907
Convention:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to de-
clare 'that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by
them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the
protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations,
as they result from the usages established among civilized peo-
ples, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the
public conscience.
This clause states that the Hague Regulations are supplemented
by the customary law of war. It is also specified that "the in-
habitants and the belligerents" remain under the protection of
international law even though they do not qualify as privileged
combatants under either Article 1 or Article 2 of the Hague Regu-
lations. It has been suggested elsewhere that the effect of this
provision is to recognize that those who come within its ambit,
including irregulars who do not meet the applicable criteria, have
the status of lawful but unprivileged combatants. 2°
IV. THE GENEVA PRISONERS OF WAR CONVENTION (1949)
A. The Influence of the Second World War
The Geneva Prisoners of War Convention of 192921 provided
a more detailed body of rules concerning the treatment of P.O.W.s
after capture than did the brief articles of the Hague Regulations
on the same subject. It did not, however, develop the law concern-
ing the juridical status of either irregular or regular combatants.
It used the incorporation by reference technique by providing that
those entitled to P.O.W. status were all those referred to in Arti-
cles 1, 2, and 3 of the Hague Regulations of 1907. 2 The Con-
vention written at Geneva in 1949 went far beyond this in specify-
21 Baxter, supra note 12. The Trial of List, "The Hostages Trial," 8 LAw
REP. OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIM. 34, 59 (U.S. Mil. Trib., Nuremberg, 1948) (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n pub. 1948) [hereinafter cited as REP. U.N. CoMM'N] did
not recognize the point made in the text and characterized adherence to the
Hague Regulations criteria as "a lawful belligerency" and its violation as "un-
lawful."
21 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
July 27, 1929, [1932] 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343.
22 Id. at Art. 1.
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ing a comprehensive body of rules governing the treatment of
P.O.W.s and also developed the law concerning the juridical
status of privileged irregular combatants by including organized
resistance movements.
The inhabitants of many of the states overrun by the German
and Japanese armies during World War II continued military
resistance through irregular or partisan forces which employed
guerrilla methods of warfare. Such irregulars were typically
executed upon capture without regard to whether or not they
complied with Article 1 of the Hague Regulations.23 The In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (I.C.R.C.) attempted
with great persistence, but with little success, to obtain the privi-
leged status of P.O.W.s for those irregulars who met the Hague
criteria. 24 The Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949 met in the
shadow of these grim events with a full awareness that the orga-
nized resistance movements had fought on the side of the wartime
United Nations. In neither the Conference nor in the prepara-
tory work leading to it was there any disposition to diminish the
privileged status of irregulars as enunciated in the Hague Regu-
lations.
At the Diplomatic Conference of 1949, a British delegate
proposed that the criteria which the Hague Regulations laid down
for irregulars be made specifically applicable to regulars of an
unrecognized government or authority.25  Committee II of the
Diplomatic Conference, however, did not deem it necessary to
expressly state that these criteria were applicable to such regular
armed forces. 26  Apparently the matter of applicability to regu-
lars was so well established in customary law that a treaty pro-
vision would have been superfluous. There was no suggestion
made that the four criteria be explicitly applicable to regulars of
recognized governments covered by Article 4A(1). The result was
to retain, and to rely upon, the customary law application to
regulars of recognized and unrecognized governments of the same
criteria which applies to irregulars. Article 4 also provides that
P.O.W. status is extended to those specified persons "who
have fallen into the power of the enemy," thereby using a broader
term than "captured" which was used in the Geneva P.O.W.
23 INT'L MIt. TRIB., supra note 4; U.S. TRIALS OF WAR CRIM., supra note 16.
24 I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 53 and n.1.
25 2A Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 414
(Swiss Fed. Pol. Dep't, 4 undated vols. numbered 1, 2A, 2B and 3) [hereinafter
cited as Geneva Rec.].
26 The Report of Committee II to the Plenary Assembly of the Conference,
2A Geneva Rec. 559, 561-62.
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Convention of 1929.27 It was sometimes contended during the
Second World War that where regulars surrendered in mass they
had not been "captured" and consequently it was not legally
required to accord them P.O.W. status.
The introductory wording of Article 4A(2) concerning irregu-
lars goes beyond Article 1 of the Hague Regulations. It charac-
terizes privileged combatants who do not comprise a part of the
regular armed forces as members of "other militias and members
of other volunteer corps, including. those of organized resistance
movements." The inclusion of "organized resistance movements"
is based upon the experience of the Second World War and ac-
cords authority and status for resistance movements which are
similar or analogous to the wartime model. The broad language
which is made applicable to such resistance movements, "operat-
ing in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is oc-
cupied," provides a comprehensive geographical area of opera-
tions for such movements which was not included in the Hague
Regulations. The wording, "outside their own territory," author-
izes resistance movements anywhere within the national territory
of the belligerent occupant. This provision is also designed to
prevent a denial of P.O.W. status to members of such movements
operating inside occupied territory. A view expressed during the
Second World War was that organized resistance movements only
had legal authority to operate in unoccupied territory. 2
B. Criteria for Irregulars to Have Privileged Status
1. Being Organized
The requirement of membership in an "organized" resistance
movement is expressly enunciated in the first traditional provision
concerning a responsible military commander and is implicit in
the other three. Its inclusion in additional wording which intro-
duces the other provisions should be interpreted as indicating
a special emphasis on the principle that irregulars or partisans
should be organized in belligerent groups which better facilitate
their compliance with the other conditions of the Article. This
basic principle had been accepted prior to the Diplomatic Con-
ference in the agreement of the Conference of Government Ex-
perts "that the first condition preliminary to granting prisoners-
27 Convention, Art. 1, supra note 21.
21 See, e.g., U.S. v. Ohlendorf, supra note 16, at 492. The Report of Com-
mittee I to the Diplomatic Conference stated that the new wording "became
necessary as a result of the experience of the Second World War." 2A Geneva
Rec. 559, 562.
1977]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
of-war status to partisans was their forming a military organiza-
tion. "29
The substantive requirement that resistance movements be
'organized" is met by the most rudimentary elements of a mili-
tary organization. Thus, a corporal's squad on detached duty
meets the requirement. In the same way, a few irregulars who
were part of a larger military unit which has become broken
through the exigencies of combat will qualify. A single individual
who has become separated from his organized unit retains his
status as a member of the organized body even though he is
unable to rejoin any part of that body before he is captured.
2. "Belonging to a Party to the Conflict"
There are alternative methods of analysis of this criterion.
Such an approach is desirable because of the possibility of some
ambiguity concerning the meaning of the term "a Party to the Con-
flict."
a. Being Associated with a State Party
to the Conflict
Neither Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration, nor Article 1
of the Hague Regulations, nor Article 4 of the 1949 Convention
provides legal authority for armed bands of marauders or pirates
acting principally for private purposes as opposed to public ones.
Even if such bands used an internal military-like discipline, they
could not meet the Brussels-Hague-Geneva criteria. The distinc-
tion made by that criteria between militia and volunteer corps
which are a part of the regular army and analogous units which
are not such a part is an important one. This distinction, never-
theless, cannot be taken to mean that there need be no connection
at all between such independent militia and volunteer corps and a
State party to the conflict. Some sort of connection between the
two usually existed as a matter of military practice and usage.
For example, during the Peninsular War there were varying de-
grees of association between the Spanish guerrillas and the British
Army under the Duke of Wellington in their common war against
the French. 30 It is well known that there were similar relation-
ships during World War II between the Allied regular armies and
the organized resistance movements fighting on the Allied side.
The absence of such an association would make even the most
29 I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 58.
30 See Draper, supra note 7, at 177.
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elementary military cooperation impossible. Some kind of as-
sociation was also helpful in establishing the public purpose of
irregulars since it was thought that a State would not consent to a
relationship with a band of marauders. The reality of the rela-
tionship was widely accepted as a part of the customs of war.
If the introductory wording of Article 4A(2) is interpreted as re-
quiring such a relationship, it would be declaratory of the existing
consensus rather than law-making.
The need for a measure of association between organized units
which are not a part of the regular army and a State party to the
conflict may also be implicit in the common Article 2(1) of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 which provides:
In addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in
peace time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of
declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if
the state of war is not recognized by one of them.
Since organized units comprising a part of the irregular armed
forces do not themselves constitute "the High Contracting Par-
ties" which may in particular contexts also be the State parties
to the conflict, 31 this provision may imply some kind of a rela-
tionship between such units and a State party to the conflict. If
there are not at least two "High Contracting Parties" that are
State parties to the conflict, there is probably not an international
conflict situation under the present doctrines and the matter would
be governed by the common Article 3 concerning internal armed
conflicts which appears in each of the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949.
The phrase "belonging to a Party to the conflict" was in-
cluded in the text of Article 4A(2) as adopted by the Special
Committee of the Second Committee32 and accepted by the
Geneva Diplomatic Conference of 1949. It replaced the provi-
sion in the draft P.O.W. Convention approved by the XVIIth
International Committee of the Red Cross Conference at Stock-
holm in 1948 which required that such organized resistance move-
ments provide notification to the occupying power of their
participation in the conflict 3  The draft provision appears to
31 Professor Abi-Saab, supra note 10, at 117, considers the liberation or resis-
tance movement a party to the conflict. Professor Baxter regards the same
conclusion as possible if the resistance movement is an international person.
See Baxter, Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics? The 1974 Diplomatic
Conference on Humanitarian Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L. J. 1, 14 (1975).
32 2A Geneva Rec. 478-79; 2B Geneva Rec. 342.
33 Art. 3(6)(a), 1 Geneva Rec. 73, 74.
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have suggested that the organized resistance movement itself could
be a party to the conflict since it, and not a different party, was to
provide the notification. There is no indication that the provision
which was adopted was regarded as diminishing the status of
organized resistance movements in comparison with the draft
provision. Since "belonging" is applicable to militia, volunteer
corps, and organized resistance movements which are not part of
the regular armed forces, such relationships that may be involved
are not the same as those which exist between a State party to the
conflict and its regular armed forces. While a governmental state-
ment of authorization or recognition of an irregular group is satis-
factory, it has been clear since the time of the Brussels Declara-
tion that this is not indispensable. Among the preeminent World
War II examples influencing the drafting of Article 4A(2) were
Marshal Tito's partisan forces. These irregular forces were by
the tacit agreement of the Allied forces, as well as by an under-
standing based upon common sense, fighting on the Allied side.34
The Yugoslavian partisans did not act pursuant to the authority
or under the control of any government. They not only rejected
any suggestion of relationship with the Royal Government of
Yugoslavia in exile, but were at the end of the war the creators of
the contemporary Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The element of "belonging to a Party to the conflict" may
be satisfied by merely a de facto relationship between the irregu-
lar unit and a State which is a party to the armed conflict. It
may be met, according to the I.C.R.C. Commentary, very in-
formally:
It may find expression merely by tacit agreement if the opera-
tions are such as to indicate clearly for which side the resistance
organization is fighting.35
It is well known that a particular provision of an international
agreement, such as Article 4A(2), should be interpreted in the
context of other relevant parts of the agreement.36 Article 4A(3)
of the P.O.W. Convention includes as privileged combatants:
Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance
to a government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
34The "experience of the Second World War" which "the authors of the
Convention wished to make specific provision to cover" is summarized in
I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 57.
35 Id.
3 See McDOUGAL, LASSWELL, & MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREEMENTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 273-302 (1967).
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This provision must be interpreted "in the light of the actual
case which motivated its drafting," that of the "forces of General
DeGaulle which were under the authority of the French National
Liberation Committee." 37 After 1940, they continued the armed
struggle against Germany contrary to the terms of the Vichy
French-German armistice agreement of that year. That armistice
expressly provided that French nationals who continued to bear
arms against the German forces would not be considered as
privileged belligerents who were entitled to the protection of the
laws of war. The German authorities, however, subsequently
acknowledged the privileged status of these forces and regarded
them as "fighting for England."3 8 Even if General De Gaulle's
forces did not "profess allegiance" to a government (they ex-
pressly opposed the Vichy French Government), the "Free
French" (later known as the "Fighting French") constituted an
unrecognized public authority, short of a government in exile,
to which they professed allegiance. An analogous situation
today would entitle such combatants to the same privileged treat-
ment of P.O.W.'s as other regulars. There is nothing to indicate
that Article 4A(2) requires a relationship for irregulars more de-
manding than the one which Article 4A(3) imposes upon regulars.
b. The Organized Resistance Movement as a
Party to the Conflict
The term "a Party to the conflict," which is somewhat am-
biguous standing alone, may be better understood by reference to
the context in which it is used. It appears in other Articles of
the P.O.W. Convention in contexts in which, in order to effec-
tuate the purposes of the Convention, it probably includes orga-
nized resistance. movements. 39  "High Contracting Parties" is
used once in the common Article 1 and twice in the common
Article 2 to refer to the State parties to the Convention. It is
used in precisely the same way at the beginning of the common
Article 3 concerning internal conflicts or civil wars. At the out-
set of the same Article, "Party to the conflict" is used in a con-
text which indicates clearly the inclusion of all of the parties to
the internal conflict. In addition to the legitimate government,
this must necessarily include the revolutionaries whose military
37 I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 62.
38 Id. at 63.
39 See these articles which use the term without further specification:
17(3) re identity cards; 65(4) re notification of P.O.W. financial accounts;
71(3) re language of P.O.W. correspondence.
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forces are typically organized as irregular groups associated with
one or more revolutionary parties. In some internal conflicts, a
revolutionary party may have a regular army structure, such as
the Confederate States Army in the Civil War in the United
-States. The last paragraph of Article 3 uses "the Parties to the
conflict" to refer to all such parties in a factual sense by providing
that the application of the humanitarian provisions shall not af-
fect their legal status. Since the legal status of States is not a
major issue, this appears to refer to the status of revolutionary
parties.
The next use of the term, "a Party to the conflict," is in
Article 4A(1). Since this subsection deals with regular armed
forces, the context which is thus provided indicates that the term
here refers, at least as the norm, to State parties to the conflict.
It probably refers to recognized State parties because the third
subsection deals with regular forces of an unrecognized govern-
ment or public authority. The next inclusion of "a Party to the
conflict" is in Article 4A(2). If it refers to a State party to the
conflict only, then the alternative analysis set forth above is ap-
plicable. The present analysis indicates that it may refer to the
irregular movement as a party to the conflict. This is a possi-
bility in view of the ambiguity of the term even when considered
in the context. The emphasis placed upon the comprehensive
geographical area of operations allocated to organized resistance
movements perhaps enhances the possibility that these movements
themselves may be such parties. It is more important that the
interpretation of the movement as a party is supported by the
experience of the Second World War upon which Article 4A(2)
is based. Marshal Tito's partisan forces, it should be recalled,
had allegiance to their own organized resistance movement which
was a party to the international conflict. They were not associ-
ated with any State party to the conflict until their successes
against the German Army made it militarily advantageous to the
Allied powers to develop a relationship to them.
At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the views of those who
wished to impose additional requirements upon organized re-
sistance movements were rejected and such movements were
assimilated to irregular militia and volunteer corps.40  Such
militia and corps were those previously specified in Article 9 of
the Brussels Declaration and Article 1 of the Hague Regulations,
neither of which required state authorization or subjection to orders
40 See Report of Committee II to the Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic
Conference (1949), 2A Geneva Rec. 559, 562.
[Vol. 9: 39
IRREGULAR COMBATANTS
from regular army headquarters. The interpretation of "a Party
to the conflict" which is consistent with the Brussels and Hague
criteria is that it makes a broad factual reference under which
the organized resistance movement, like an irregular militia or
volunteer corps, may be a party to the conflict. This interpretation
also makes the word "belonging" in the English text more ac-
curate because organized resistance forces can clearly "belong"
to their own movement which is a party to the conflict. Such
forces cannot "belong," in the sense of subordination and con-
trol, to a State party to the conflict. If they do "belong" in such a
meaning, they are no longer irregular forces under Article 4A(2)
but are regular militias or volunteer corps under Article 4A(1).
Professor Baxter has made the constructive suggestion that an
organized resistance movement can be a party to the conflict if it is
recognized as an international person. 41  This should present no
difficulties to viable organized resistance movements since recog-
nition from an international law perspective is based upon factual
realities rather than upon idiosyncratic national policies.42
3. Being Under Responsible Military Command
This provision and the ensuing three provisions are the same
traditional requirements of Article 9 of the Brussels Declaration
and Article 1 of the Hague Regulations. The present requirement
limits privileged status to those irregulars who are a part of a bellig-
erent group with a hierarchical authority which assumes responsi-
bility for the actions of its members. It is not necessary that the
commander be a regular army officer or be commissioned by a gov-
ernment. The U.S. Army Manual, The Law of Land Warfare, de-
clares that "state recognition, however, is not essential, and an or-
ganization may be formed spontaneously and elect its own
officers." 43  The main purpose for having a "responsible com-
mander" is to provide for reasonable assurance of adherence by
irregulars to the fundamental requirement of compliance with the
laws of war. It is thought that a-somewhat effective sanction exists
by making the commander "responsible for his subordinates." Al-
though there is no stated limitation upon the responsibility of the
commander, the requirement should be interpreted so as to effectu-
41 See Baxter, supra note 31.
42 The leading case which emphasizes the empirical character of the inter-
national law determination is Great Britain v. Costa Rica, "The Tinoco Claims
Arbitration," 18 AM. J. INT'L L. [Docs.] 147 (1924).
43 Field Manual 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, 64 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as FM 27-10]. The lack of need for state recognition is also
relevant to the requirement of "belonging to a Party to the conflict."
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ate its major purpose. This is to have a practical and working com-
mand structure which is strengthened by making the commander
responsible for those actions of his subordinates which a reasonable
military commander should control. While the dividing line can-
not be fixed in advance so as to cover all possible fact situations,
some of the clearer situations can be identified. If subordinates
attack non-combatant targets as such, the commander is re-
sponsible. If a subordinate commits an isolated murder for his
own personal objectives and while not subject to the control of
the commander, the latter is not responsible. Command must
be exercised in the preparation and execution of military operations
but not at all times without exception.
In the post-World War II war crimes trials, the defense of
superior orders was available to subordinates in some situations.
In general, it was not treated as a bar to the conviction of a
subordinate for executing an illegal order but, dependent upon
all the circumstances, it was considered in mitigation of punish-
ment. 44  It should be apparent that unless some effect is given
to the defense of superior orders, each subordinate is invited to
determine the legality of orders for himself with destructive con-
sequences for the discipline which is an inseparable part of mili-
tary command. There is no doubt that the commander who issues
illegal orders is responsible for them.45
4. Wearing a Fixed Distinctive Sign
Article 4A(2)(b) prescribes "having a fixed distinctive sign
recognizable at a distance," and it is apparent that the sign must
be worn so that it is visible. This distinctive sign requirement
for the irregular is analogous to the wearing of a uniform by a reg-
ular. Each requirement is designed to allow privileged status to
those combatants who are distinguishable in appearance from the
civilian population. The sign must nominally be "fixed," but it
is widely agreed that the requirement is met by an armband, an
insignia, or, for example, a distinctive headgear or coat.46 These
44 McDOUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 690-99 analyzes the war crimes
trial re superior orders. See also Parks, Command Responsibility for War Crimes,
62 MIL. L. R. 1 (1973).
45 Trial of Kurt Meyer, "The Abbaye Ardenne Case," 4 REP. U.N. COMM'N
97 (Can. Mil. Ct., Aurich, Germany, 1945); Trial of Baba Masao, 11 REP. U.N.
COMM'N 56 (Austl. Mil. Ct., Rabaul, 1947); Trial of Wilhelm Von Leeb, "The
German High Command Trial," 12 REP. U.N. COMM'N 1 (U.S. Mil. Trib.,
Nuremberg, 1948). The cited cases deal with regular army commanders but it
is unlikely that a significantly different standard would be applied to irregular
commanders.
46 FM 27-10, supra note 43, at 64.
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items, like the more distinctive portions of a regular military uni-
form, are susceptible to being rapidly disposed of should the need
arise.
The requirement that the sign be "recognizable at a distance"
is rather vague since there is no specification of such obvious
questions as to what distance, by whom, and in what circumstances.
The distinctive sign of irregulars, like the uniform of regulars,
need only be worn during military operations.4" Such operations
should be reasonably construed as including deployments which
are preliminary to actual combat. The sign should be the same
for all members of a particular resistance organization.
The foregoing may appear to suggest that this appearance
requirement applicable to irregulars is much less stringent than
the requirement of a uniform for regulars. It should be recalled,
however, that the purpose of the contemporary regular uniforms
is to provide maximum camouflage in the physical environment. 48
Since regulars establish the standard, then irregulars also may
become as near to invisible in the landscape as possible without
losing their privileged status so long as they remain distinguishable
from noncombatants.
In the Trial of Skorzeny,49 Colonel Otto Skorzeny and others
serving under his command in the German Army were charged
with a criminal offense in that, while participating in the Ardennes
offensive, they wore American uniforms and treacherously fired
upon and killed members of the United States armed forces.
The facts also showed that they used American "jeep" vehicles
and other equipment to further their disguise. The evidence did
not conclusively establish that the defendants had killed American
personnel in these circumstances and all the accused were ac-
quitted. It seems improbable that irregulars should be held to a
higher standard than regulars were in this case.
5. Carrying Arms Openly
The purpose of this requirement is to prevent irregulars, at
the risk of forfeiting their privileged status as prisoners of war
upon capture, from perfidiously misleading the enemy by conceal-
" The Conference of Government Experts prior to the Geneva Conference-
of 1949 recommended that irregulars should be required to "habitually and con-
stantly display a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" but this was
rejected. I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 59-60.
48 M. GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 59 (1959).
49 9 REP. U.N. COMM'N 90 (U.S. Mil. Gov't Ct., Germany, 1947).
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ing their own identity.50 The conditions of "open arms" and
"distinctive sign" emphasize the necessity that irregulars dis-
tinguish themselves as combatants during their operations against
the enemy. The I.C.R.C. Commentary states that the require-
ment that arms be carried "openly" means that the "enemy must
be able to recognize partisans as combatants in the same way as
regular armed forces, whatever their weapons."5l Similarly,
it cannot be interpreted to mean that irregulars are under an
obligation to carry their arms "more openly" than 'does a regular
soldier. The Commentary states: "[lit is not an attempt to pre-
scribe that a hand-grenade or a revolver must be carried at belt
or shoulder rather than in a pocket or under a coat,''52 and
also that:
[A]lthough the difference may seem slight, there must be no
confusion between carrying arms "openly" and carrying them
"visibly" or "ostensibly." Surprise is a factor in any war opera-
tion, whether or not involving regular troops.5 3
These statements are applicable to irregulars who are complying
with the laws and customs of war including wearing a fixed
distinctive sign. An irregular in civilian clothing who approaches
an enemy sentinel and suddenly attacks with a previously hidden
revolver or hand grenade has clearly violated the law. The open
arms requirement, like that of the distinctive sign, is only applicable
during military operations.
6. Complying with the Laws and Customs of War
a. Analysis of the Requirement
This requirement is an expression of the fundamental concept
which constitutes the basis for the whole body of the law of war.
Unless hostilities "are to degenerate into a savage contest of
physical forces freed from all restraints," the laws and customs of
war must continue to he observed in all relevant circumstances.5 4
It prescribes that irregulars, on the same basis as regulars, are
bound to conform in the conduct of their operations to the recog-
nized standards of the international humanitarian law.
50 Acts of perfidy are in violation of the laws and customs of war. See
OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 430.
51 I.C.R.C., stupra note 5, at 61.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 OPPENHElM-LAUTERPACHT, supra note 18, at 218. The criteria considered
in the present analysis is not limited to irregular soldiers but also includes ir-
regular sailors and airmen.
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While it is clear that the present requirement includes each of
the preceding criteria of Article 4A(2), its full ambit is not de-
fined with precision. The I.C.R.C. Commentary recognizes that
"the concept of the laws and customs of war is rather vague and
subject to variations as the forms of war evolve. ' ' 55  In attempt-
ing to give it some precision, the Commentary states, "[Tihe
term 'resistance'," as employed in Article 4A(2) should cover,
"not only open conflict against the Occupying Power, but also
other forms of opposition to the latter. ' '56 In spite of the problem
of "vagueness," there exist some criteria for judging the lawful-
ness or otherwise of the particular actions of combatants and for
holding the perpetrators of illegitimate acts of warfare criminally
responsible for their behavior. The U.S. Army Law of Land War-
fare provides a representative description of such conduct as would
be considered violative of the laws and customs of war by es-
pecially warning against:
employment of treachery, denial of quarter, maltreatment of
prisoners of war, wounded, and dead, improper conduct toward
flags of truce, pillage, and unnecessary violence and destruc-
tion.S7
These acts would, of course, be equally violative of law if com-
mitted by regular forces.
A further explanation of the basic character of the condition
of adhering to the laws and customs of war is provided in the
I.C.R.C. Commentary:
Partisans [irregulars] are . . . required to respect the Geneva
Conventions to the fullest extent possible. In particular, they
must conform to international agreements as those which pro-
hibit the use of certain weapons (gas). In all their operations,
they must be guided by the moral criteria which, in the absence
of written provisions, must direct the conscience of man; in
launching attacks, they must not cause violence and suffering
disproportionate to the military result which they may reason-
ably hope to achieve. They may not attack civilians or dis-
armed persons and must, in all their operations, respect the
principles of honour and loyalty as they expect their enemies to
do. 58
The important matter, set forth in the last italicized clause
of the statement, points out the consequences of a belligerent
State's persistent and demonstrable disregard of the rules of inter-
55 I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 61.
56 Id. at 58.
57 FM 27-10, supra note 43, at 64.
51 I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 61. (Emphasis added.)
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national law as, for example, in its treatment of the inhabitants
of the territory under belligerent occupation. It also indicates
the unreality of expecting irregulars to adhere to the law when
a State violates it. As a practical matter in obtaining enforce-
ment of the laws and customs of war by resistance movements
"operating in or outside their own territory," observance of the
doctrines by State parties to the conflict is important in estab-
lishing conditions for mutuality and reciprocity which promote
similar observance by irregulars. In addition, the State parties
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions have unilateral obligations, not
contingent upon mutuality, in the common Article 1 "to respect
and to ensure respect" for the Conventions. Since resistance
movements were not, as such, represented at Geneva in 1949, it
is fatuous to expect them to adhere to the laws and customs of
war in situations where the States violate the rules which the States
wrote and adopted there.
The first italicized clause in the statement quoted refers to
irregulars adhering to the Conventions "to the fullest extent pos-
sible." This is an eminently practical recognition of the military
reality that even relatively well organized and disciplined resis-
tance movements operate under severe handicaps which regular
armed forces often avoid. The experiences of resistance move-
ments in World War II, as well as in irregular warfare since
then, amply bear out that such difficulties exist. The I.C.R.C. Com-
mentary has thus recognized that, since in the real world of events
even regulars do not invariably adhere to the laws and customs of
war, it is better to have irregulars adhere as much as possible
rather than not at all.
The humanitarian treatment of prisoners of war in contem-
porary conflict situations is an appropriate subject for concern.
It is clear that the State parties to the P.O.W. Convention are
bound to carry out all of the very detailed administrative arrange-
ments concerning the protection and care of P.O.W.s which ap-
pear in the 143 Articles of the Convention. It would require a
considerable departure from reality to expect irregular forces to
meet the same requirements in the treatment of P.O.W.s in their
hands. A provision of the draft P.O.W. Convention prepared
by the I.C.R.C. stated that irregulars, in addition to the four cri-
teria first formulated in the Brussels Declaration, must also
treat nationals of the Occupying Power who fall into their
hands in accordance with the provisions of the present Conven-
tion." 9  This provision was deleted by the Diplomatic Confer-
5' Article 3(6)(b), 1 Geneva Rec. 73, 74.
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ence because of an unwillingness to impose additional criteria
beyond the four traditional ones. The outcome is a recognition
of the realities with which irregular forces and their P.O.W.s are
confronted. One should not, however, leap to the opposite con-
clusion and believe that prisoners are at the mercy of irregular
forces. At the minimum, fundamental humanitarian treatment
must be accorded to prisoners in the hands of irregulars. This
is required by the terms of Article 13 of the P.O.W. Convention
which expressly prohibits reprisals against P.O.W.s. Article 14
requires respect for the persons and the honor of prisoners and
includes special protection for women. Article 15 provides for
necessary medical attention and this means, at the least, the stan-
dard of medical care usually provided in the irregular force and,
where it is available, a considerably higher standard. Article 16
prohibits adverse distinctions "based on race, nationality, religious
beliefs or political opinions, or any other distinction founded on
similar criteria." These fundamentals, among others, must be
extended to prisoners in the hands of irregular forces as a part of
their obligation to obey the laws and customs of war.60
The central legal policy objective in the requirement of adher-
ing to the "laws and customs of war" is that this is designed to
promote maximum lawfulness in the conduct of hostilities. An
unworkable rigidity in doctrinal formulation and application could
lead irregulars to the conclusion that if they cannot meet all the
requirements of the legal system, they have nothing to lose by
violation of law. Unless irregulars commit violations of the laws
of war of the type which involves destruction of noncombatant
human values and militarily irrelevant material values, it is doubt-
ful that the present condition is violated and that privileged
belligerent status may be denied to them lawfully.61
This conclusion is more compelling if the test of adherence to
"the laws and customs of war" is applied to regular armed forces
in lieu of the complacent view that their compliance may be as-
sumed. These criteria are applied to irregulars no matter how dif-
ficult the factual conditions under which they conduct their mili-
tary operations. It is essential to apply the same criteria to the
regulars who comprise a standing governmental instrument spe-
cialized in the use of violence and with an undoubted ability to
do so consistent with law. Regular forces have conducted inten-
60 Other articles which may be applicable to organized resistance movements
as parties to the conflict are cited supra note 39.
61 The text is'analogous to the municipal criminal law principle requiring
that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
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sive bombing of densely populated urban areas as well as em-
ploying so-called "free fire zones" in places where it is known
that there is a considerable noncombatant civilian population. If
these methods of warfare, along with aerial bombing "reprisals"
directed at refugee camps which probably harbor some irregulars
as well as a substantial population of noncombatants, are lawful
for regular armed forces,62 it becomes very difficult to apply a
higher standard to irregular forces. If any law of armed con-
flict is to be preserved, it is essential to recognize that such di-
rect attacks on civilians are unlawful without regard to the identity
of the perpetrators. Professor Lauterpacht has enunciated the
central point which he characterizes as an "absolute rule of law":
Nevertheless it is in that prohibition, which is a clear rule of law,
of intentional terrorization - or destruction - of the civilian
population as an avowed or obvious, object of attack that lies
the last vestige of the claim that war can be legally regulated
at all. Without that irreducible principle of restraint there is
no limit to the licence and depravity of force.63
It is useful to consider briefly the applicability of each of the
six criteria of Article 4A(2) to the group and to its individual mem-
bers. Each of the six criteria is imposed upon the irregular group
as an entity. According to the widely accepted view, if the
group does not meet the first three criteria (organization, associ-
ation with a party to the conflict, and military command), the
individual member cannot qualify for privileged status as a
P.O.W.64  The last three criteria (distinctive sign, open arms,
and adhering to laws and customs) must be met by both the group
as a whole and the individual member to entitle the latter to
privileged status. 65  The Law of Land Warfare sets forth the ac-
cepted principle that group adherence to the sixth criterion is
"fulfilled if most 'of the members of the [irregular] body ob-
serve the laws and customs of war, notwithstanding the fact that
the individual member concerned may have committed a war
crime."-66  In the same way, group adherence to the distinctive
sign and open arms criteria is met if most of the members of the
group comply. Because of both the need to bring irregulars
within the legal system and the humanitarian purpose of the ap-
62See Carnahan, The Law of Air Bombardment in its Historical Context, 17
AIR FORCE L. R. 39 (Summer, 1975).
63 The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
360, 369 (1952).
64 See, e.g., Draper, supra note 7, at 196.
65 Id.
66 FM 27-10, supra note 43, at 64.
[Vol. 9: 39
IRREGULAR COMBATANTS
plicable law, state officials should not lightly reach the conclusion that
most of the members of an irregular group do not comply with
one of the last three criteria.
The individual who complies with each of these three last cri-
teria, but whose group does not comply with one of them, is de-
nied privileged status. While this is a lawful result, it seems un-
fair and harsh to the individual who wears a distinctive sign,
carries arms openly, and adheres to the laws and customs. From
his or her perspective, it could appear to be the imposition of a
collective punishment where there is no personal guilt. Even
though these last three traditional requirements of Article 4A(2)
are stated to be 'applied to the group, this must be interpreted in
a reasonable way so as to further the overriding humanitarian
purpose of the P.O.W. Convention. At the least, this purpose
should lead to a substantial mitigation of the punishment of the
individual which is usually involved in a denial of privileged status.
Before concluding the analysis of the requirement of conduct-
ing operations in compliance with "the laws and customs of war,"
it should be mentioned briefly that military units which are spe-
cially trained and utilized to violate the laws of war do not meet
the group requirement of adherence to these laws. Examples of
such regular forces from the Second World War include the in-
famous Einsatzgruppen or special task forces of the German Gov-
ernment for the killing of the "racially inferior" enemy civilian
population67  as well as the Japanese Army "military police"
which had particular responsibility for attacks upon despised mem-
bers of the civilian population in the Japanese-occupied territories.
There are, unfortunately, numerous contemporary examples of
regular and irregular armed forces which systematically violate
the laws and customs of war. 68
b. Situations Where Reprisals Are Applicable
The' Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims
of 1949 have prohibited all reprisals against P.O.W.'s, protected
civilians, and militarily ineffective combatants, that is, those who
are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked.69  This leaves reprisals still
61 Col. Draper makes the surprising statement that there is an issue concern-
ing whether or not the Einsatzgruppen belonged to the German Government.
Draper, supra note 7, at 200-201.
68 A systematic inventory of examples should indicate that they do not ap-
pear upon only one side of the political or ideological spectrum.
61 Art. 46, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Art. 47, Geneva Convention
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applicable to effective combatant forces. The U.S. Army Law
of Land Warfare provides the following definition:
Reprisals are acts of retaliation in the form of conduct
which would otherwise be unlawful, resorted to by one belli-
gerent against enemy personnel or property for acts of warfare
committed by the other belligerent in violation of the law of
war, for the purpose of enforcing future compliance with the
recognized rules of civilized warfareY°
The doctrine of reprisals is applicable, inter alia to situations
where a belligerent occupant persistently disregards the interna-
tional law limitations upon its authority in the occupied territory.
Such continuous violations of the Geneva Civilians Convention
are not only violations by the belligerent occupant, but also con-
stitute violations by the other State parties to the Convention be-
cause of their unilateral obligation under the common Article I
"to ensure respect" for the Convention as well as to respect it.
If such violations of law, nevertheless, are continued, this gives
to the resistance forces a right to conduct military operations in a
way which goes beyond the usual lawful bounds of military re-
sistance and self-defense. Even in such a situation, attacks upon
civilians cannot be justified.
In the post-World War II war crimes trials, it was recognized
that where an objective judicial determination was made, German
officials could inflict severe punishment upon irregulars who did
not meet the requirements of the Hague Regulations for privi-
leged combatant status. Where such resistance, however, was as-
certained to have been caused by the unlawful conduct of the
belligerent occupant, the opposite conclusion was reached.
The acts of resistance were then determined to be lawful measures
of and ones, significantly, reprisal to which the occupant was held
to have no legal authority to institute counter-reprisals. In Re
Christiansen,"1 the Netherlands Special Court (War Criminals) at
Arnhem tried the commander of the German Army of Occupa-
for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Art. 13(3), Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No.
3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter cited as P.O.W. Conv.]; Art. 33(3), Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, [1956] 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287
[hereinafter cited as Civ. Conv.].
7) Para 497(a). The same 'source stresses that reprisals should not be re-
sorted to in a hasty and ill-considered manner. Para. 497(b). See g enerally
F. KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS (1971).
71 [1948] ANN. DiG. INT'L L. CASES 412 (1948).
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tion in Holland who was accused, inter alia, of ordering the forcible
removal and expulsion of the civilian population of the village of
Tutten and the destruction by fire and otherwise of a large num-
ber of buildings in the town as a reprisal for an attack by members
of the Dutch resistance. General Christiansen defended on the
ground that his acts were permissible acts of reprisal against illegal
acts of the resistance movement.7 2  In rejecting this defense, the
court said that the acts of resistance were occasioned by the occu-
pant's violations of law and that there was no legal basis for in-
voking counter-reprisals. "The reason was that their [the irregu-
lar resistance forces] acts were acts of justifiable defence which
the Occupying Power was forbidden either to punish or to counter
with reprisals. ''73
In the same way, the opinion in the Einsatzgruppen Case74 stated
concerning the claim of reprisals which was made in defense:
If it is assumed that some of the resistance units in Russia
or members of the population did commit acts which were in
themselves unlawful under the rules of war, it would still have
to be shown that these acts were not in legitimate defense
against wrongs perpetrated upon them by the invader. Under
international law, as in domestic law, there can be no reprisal
against reprisal. The assassin who is being repulsed by his in-
tended victim may not slay him and then, in turn, plead self-
defense.7 s
In summary, the doctrine of reprisals, in particular factual con-
texts involving, inter alia, persistent violations of law by the
belligerent occupant, gives resistance forces an exceptional legal
right to conduct military operations by methods which would
otherwise be in violation of "the laws and customs of war."
V. APPLICATION OF THE CRITERIA TO IRREGULAR COMBATANTS
A. Application of the Hague Regulations
in the Post-World War II War Crimes Cases
The trials following the Second World War, except for the
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, were
conducted by courts which were constituted by municipal law
authority. Their decisions are relevant to the present analysis
because the respective municipal laws of the Western Allies re-
quired that the accepted principles of international law be ap-
72 Id. at 413.
13 Id. at 414.
14 Supra note 16.
75 Id. at 493.
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plied.76 In analyzing these cases, it is important to recall that
military courts, like civilian juries, do not usually give reasons for
conclusions of fact.
The Trial of Bauer"7 took place before the French Permanent
Military Tribunal at Dijon in 1945. The facts involved a German
column under the command of Colonel Bauer which, during August
and September, 1944, was retreating from the area of Bordeaux
and had reached the town of Autun where it engaged in a battle
with a force of French regulars and some members of the French
Forces of the Interior (F.F.I.). 78  Three members of the F.F.I.
were captured and were summarily executed for the alleged of-
fence of acting as combatants. The charge against Bauer and
some of his subordinates was the murder of the three irregular
combatants who were entitled to P.O.W. status. According to
the prosecution, the three members of the F.F.I. were dressed
almost entirely in civilian clothes, but there was some testimony
to indicate that one or two of them wore French tri-color dis-
tinctive marks and that the third wore a khaki overall. The
accused were convicted as charged and, while Bauer was sen-
tenced to death, his subordinates received lesser sentences since
they had acted pursuant to his orders.
The prosecution invoked Article 2 of the Hague Regulations
of 1907 concerning mass levies which provides:
The inhabitants of a territory which has not been occupied,
who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up
arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to
organize themselves in accordance with Article 1, shall be re-
garded as belligerents if they carry arms openly and if they re-
spect the laws and customs of war.
76 The applicable British law is set forth in 1 REP. U.N. COMM'N 105 (1947),
and the Royal Warrant of June 18, 1945, is in T. Taylor, Final Report to the
Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials Under Control
Council Law No. 10 at 254 (1949). The French law is in 3 REP. U.N. COMM'N
93 (1948). The Netherlands law is in 11 REP. U.N..COMM'N 86 (1949). The
United States law is in 3 REP. U.N. COMM'N 103 (1948) and in 15 U.S. TRIALS
WAR CRIM. passim. (1949) covering procedure, practice and administration.
See also Koessler, American War Crimes Trials in Europe, 39 GEO. L. J. 18
(1950). See generally on the applicable law, Digest of Laws and Cases, 15 REP.
U.N. COMM'N passim (1949).
7 8 REP. U.N. COMM'N 15 (1949).
78 General Eisenhower's proclamation of July 15, 1944, designated the F.F.I.
as a regular army under his command. See I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 57, n.2.
The report of the present case, however, considers the members of the F.F.I.
as irregulars.
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Article 42 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 emphasizes the
concept of effective occupation7 9 and provides:
Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed
under the authority of the hostile army.
The occupation extends only to the territory where such
authority has been established and can be exercised.
It is clear that the two requirements of Article 2 concerning
open arms and respecting the laws and customs of war were met
by the captured members of the F.F.I. A significant feature of
this case is that, while Article 2 deals with mass levies which are
activated "on the approach of the enemy," the court apparently
had no hesitancy in applying the same concept to a situation
where the enemy was in retreat; that is, departing rather than
approaching, and where the effective occupation had been termi-
nated rather than not yet started. It is possible that "the approach
of the enemy" may be properly interpreted as an enemy making a
tactical stand and engaging in combat even though, from the
strategic viewpoint, the enemy is engaged in a retreat. The wide-
spread practice of irregulars joining in military operations with
regular army units which were engaged in the liberation of oc-
cupied territory in the latter part of the Second World War clearly
influenced the decision of the court.
If the prosecution had claimed that the F.F.I. members were
entitled to the privileged treatment of P.O.W.s under Article 1
rather than under Article 2, the issue concerning effective occupa-
tion would have been irrelevant. It seems probable that the
F.F.I. irregulars could have met all four requirements of Article 1
since their participation in the combat situation with French regular
units indicated that they were under responsible military com-
mand. In addition, the testimony concerning tri-color distinctive
badges and khaki overalls manifests a distinction in appearance
between the irregulars and the civilian population.
In the Trial of Renoth8° before a British Military Court in
Germany, the principal defendants were accused of committing
a war crime:
in that they at Elten, Germany on 16th September 1944 in viola-
tion of the laws and usages of war, were concerned in the killing
of an unknown Allied airman, a prisoner of war.8 '
, This concept is now replaced by the provision in the common Article 2 of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions that each Convention "shall also apply to all cases
of partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party."
See Belli. ()ccupation, supra note 8, at 188.
10 11 REP. U.N. COMM'N 76 (1949).
91 Id.
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Two of the defendants were policemen and two were customs
officials. The prosecution charged that after the Allied aircraft
crashed on German soil, and the airman emerged unhurt, he was
"arrested" by Renoth and then attacked and beaten with fists
and rifles by a number of individuals including the three other
accused. Renoth, the principal defendant, who pleaded the de-
fense of superior orders at the trial, stood aside while these
events took place and then shot and killed the pilot. All of the
accused were convicted. It is clear that the deceased airman was
entitled to the privileged status of a P.O.W. and that the de-
fendants, as government officials, had a particular obligation to
protect him rather than to permit and join with a murderous at-
tack upon him.
There is an inference in this case that the airman was beaten
and killed because he was thought by the defendants to have
violated the laws and customs of war by attacking civilian targets.
Assuming that this was the actual situation, the case illustrates
the crucial point that the airman should, nevertheless, have been
protected and accorded P.O.W. status. Any charges against him
should have been brought in a judicial trial with its accompanying
safeguards. In analogous circumstances where doubt may exist
concerning compliance with the laws and customs of war, an
irregular combatant has the same right to be accorded privileged
status as a P.O.W. even though he may later face charges before
a proper court.
The necessity for according prisoner of war status to all privi-
leged combatants on a nondiscriminatory basis is illustrated by
the Trial of Schoengrath82 before a British Military Court in
Germany in 1946. In this case, the defendants, seven members of
the Nazi SS, were charged with committing a war crime "in
the killing of an unknown Allied airman, a prisoner of war." The
facts concerned an airman who had descended by parachute from
his damaged bomber aircraft which had been flying westward
over occupied Holland. The defendants, apparently acting on the
assumption that he was an Allied airman, shot him shortly after
his capture rather than accord him status as a P.O.W. The
defense contended that there was no case to answer because the
prosecution had produced no evidence to show that the victim
was in fact an Allied airman. The prosecution replied that it
was too far-fetched to assume that the bomber aircraft involved,
in view of the facts, had neutral status. The court convicted
the defendants as charged even though the nationality of the air-
12 11 REP. U.N. COMM'N 83.
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man was not proved. The decision is sound because the airman
was entitled to prisoner of war status in the light of the facts which
were shown. Even if he had been a neutral national serving in
the air force of an Allied state, he would have been entitled to
privileged combatant status without discrimination.
Because irregulars are entitled to P.O.W. status on the same
criteria as regulars, it follows that a neutral national serving in an
irregular force is entitled to privileged status. To describe such
an irregular of neutral nationality as a "mercenary" may well
impugn his political motivation from the standpoint of the prefer-
ences of his opponents, but it should not deprive him of a privileged
status to which he is otherwise legally entitled. A contrary result
would lead to a substantial politicalization of the relevant law
and a corresponding diminution of its essential humanitarian and
nondiscriminatory characteristics.83
In the Trial of Von Falkenhorst84 before a British Military
Court at Brunswick, the accused had held the rank of general
and had been commander-in-chief of the German armed forces
in Norway. He was charged with a war crime in causing the
killing of members of Allied armed forces by, inter alia, passing
to his subordinates Hitler's infamous "Commando Order."85
The first paragraph of the Order stated that the Allied powers
had been using methods of warfare prohibited by treaty and that,
in particular, the "brutal and treacherous" commandos were
under orders to kill "defenceless prisoners." The Order further
required that quarter be refused to commandos, whether captured
in uniform or not, and directed the court martial of officers who
failed to instruct their troops accordingly or who acted contrary
to its provisions. The defense was that Von Falkenhorst "took
this measure as a reprisal" and that he was not able to verify the
facts set forth by Hitler. The accused was found guilty and it is
probable that his rank and position as a commander-in-chief
placed a higher standard upon him than would have been imposed
upon a subordinate commander. Because Norway was often
the scene of commando raids, he could have ascertained that the
commandos adhered to the laws and customs of war and this
would have eliminated any basis for the claim of reprisals. In
additiori, the then effective Geneva P.O.W. Convention of 1929
13 See Note, The Laws of War and the Angolan Trial of Mercenaries, 9 CASE W.
REs. J. INT'L L. 323 (1977).
1 11 REP. U.N. COMM'N 18 (1949).
11 The "Commando Order," 11 REP. U.N. CoMM'N 20-21.
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prohibited reprisals against P.O.W.s86 and the same prohibition
is also set forth in the 1949 P.O.W. Convention.8 7 It is a funda-
mental element in even an unduly narrow interpretation of the
laws and customs of war. Consequently, it governs both ir-
regulars and regulars in their treatment of P.O.W.s.
B. Application of the Geneva P.O. W. Convention (1949)
Article 5(2) of the P.O.W. Convention provides:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having com-
mitted a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the
enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4,
such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Conven-
tion until such time as their status has been determined by a
competent tribunal.
It is clear that in doubtful cases, pending judicial determina-
tion, provisional privileged status must be granted. The I.C.R.C.
draft provision which was approved by the Stockholm Conference
stated that in cases of doubt the status of the person concerned
should be "determined by some responsible authority."88  The
Geneva Conference rejected this wording on the grounds that it
might permit hasty decisions by military personnel in a battle-
field context. 89 After considering the words "military tribunal,"
the Geneva Conference decided upon "competent tribunal" but
without providing detailed specification of the characteristics of
such a tribunal.90 At the minimum standard which has been
established in customary law as essential for fair adjudication,
such a court should be composed of an impartial judge or judges
and make provision for representation of the person whose status
is in doubt by competent counsel in order to provide the basic
elements of a fair trial. The application of this minimum
standard would mean that Nazi-type courts dominated by a racist
or analogous discriminatory ideology could not meet the require-
ments of a competent tribunal. The common Article 3 concerning
internal conflicts requires that judgments concerning combatants
must be pronounced by "a regularly constituted court affording
all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable
86 Supra note 21, Art. 2(3). Reprisal and counter-reprisal killings of
P.O.W.s by the German Army and the French Forces of the Interior are de-
scribed and analyzed in KALSHOVEN, supra note 70, at 193-200.
87 Art. 13(3).
8 I.C.R.C., supra note 5, at 77.
89 Id.
10 Id. and 2A Geneva Rec. 388.
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by civilized peoples."91 Since internal conflicts had not previ-
ously been regulated on a multilateral basis, it was deemed neces-
sary to describe the applicable judicial standard. There is no
basis to believe that the shorter wording in Article 5(2) concern-
ing courts which determitie the status of combatants in interna-
tional conflicts imposes a lower standard.
In Military Prosecutor v. Kassem,2 decided by an Israeli Mili-
tary Court sitting in Ramallah on April 13, 1969, the question of
entitlement of irregulars to P.O.W. status was considered. The
defendants were captured after an exchange of gunfire with an
Israeli Army unit and while wearing dark green uniforms and
peaked caps and carrying arms openly. They also carried military
identification papers issued by the Popular Front for the Libera-
tion of Palestine of which they were members. 93  The court
denied their claim to P.O.W. status on the basis of the following
interpretation of the English text of Article 4A(2).
For some reason, however, the literature on the subject over-
looks the most basic condition of the right of combatants to be
considered upon capture as prisoners of war, namely, the condi-
tion that the irregular forces must belong to a belligerent party.
If they do not belong to the Government or State for which they
fight, then it seems to us that, from the outset, under current
International Law they do not possess the right to enjoy the
status of prisoners of war upon capture. 4
The court interpreted "belonging" as requiring irregular
subordination to state control including a command relationship.
This holding recalls the situation which existed during the Franco-
Prussian War. It has been decisively rejected by modern inter-
national law since the refusal of the Brussels Conference to accept
the draft provision that irregulars be "subject to orders from head-
quarters. '"95 If the defendants had "belonged" to a State party
to the conflict, in the sense of being under its direction and com-
mand, they would have been entitled to P.O.W. status under
Article 4A(1) which includes "members of militia or volunteer
corps forming part of such [regular] armed forces." It becomes
91 Art. 3(1)(d).
w 42 INT'L L. REP. 470 (1971).
93 This demonstrates Popular Front compliance with P.O.W. Conv. Art. 17
(3) which provides: "Each party to a conflict is required to furnish the persons
under its jurisdiction who are liable to become prisoners .of war, with an idintity
card ...... Supra note 69.
4 Supra note 92, at 476.
r See text following note 14 supra.
96 See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
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impossible to effectuate the major purposes of Article 4A(2),
including bringing irregulars within the legal system, if it is
interpreted in a manner to make it indistinguishable from Article
4A(1).
Professor Schwarzenberger has also evaluated the holding in
the Kassem Case. He has pointed out that the court improperly
gave weight to the illegality of the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine under the municipal law of the Kingdom of Jordan. 97
After referring to the introductory wording in Article 4A(2) of
the P.O.W. Convention, he states:
Any of these words are capable of liberal and restrictive in-
terpretations. Yet, in accordance with the humanitarian objects
of the Geneva Conventions, a liberal interpretation of words
such as "belong" and "Party to the conflict" appears to be more
appropriate. In this view of the matter, an organization can
"belong" to a country, irrespective of whether it is recognized
by the Government or whether, under the law of a particular
State, it is legal or illegal.98
The court also held that the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine failed to comply with the laws and customs of war
and provided several examples of apparent group violations, but
no violations by the defendants individually were suggested. 99
There is no indication in the report of the case that defense
counsel raised the issue of the possible exceptional legality of
particular acts of resistance (not including direct attacks upon
noncombatants) as reprisals to prior violations of law by the
belligerent occupant as was done in the Einsatzgruppen Case.10o
The U.S. Army Military Assistance Command Vietnam
97 Human Rights and Guerrilla Warfare, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RTS. 246, 249-
250 (1971).
" Id. at 250.
99 INT'L L. REP., supra note 92, at 483.
100 See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra. Probably the most comprehensive
violation of law by the Government of Israel concerning belligerent occupation
is its refusal to apply the Geneva Civilians Convention to which it is a state
party. The consistent position of the U.S. Government and of the United Na-
tions Security Council, that the Convention is legally applicable, is reflected in
75 DEP'T STATE BULL. 692-95 (1976) which includes the Security Council Con-
sensus Statement on the subject of Nov. 11, 1976.
According, to the Geneva Civilians Conv., supra note 69, Art. 158(3), a de-
nunciation shall not take effect until 1 year after notice is given and, when the
denouncing power is involved in a conflict, the denunciation shall not take ef-
fect "until peace has been concluded." Israel has not attempted denuncia-
tion, as such. Semi-official Israeli viewpoints appear in Blum, The Missing
Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 279
(1968); Shamgar, The Observance of International Law in the Administered Terri-
tories, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. HUMAN RTS. 262 (1971).
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(MACV) Directive 381-46, dated December 27, 1967101 concerning
the classification of captured personnel, provides a further ex-
ample of application of the requirements of the P.O.W. Conven-
tion Article 4A(2). Under the MACV Directive, the Viet Cong,
including both main force and local force units as well as units
of the regular North Vietnamese Army were accorded P.O.W.
status upon capture.'02
"Irregulars" are characterized in the Directive in a separate
heading as comprising: (1) Guerrillas, (2) Self-Defense Force, and
(3) Secret Self-Defense Force.10 3  Membership in one of these
units, without more, does not entitle an individual to P.O.W.
status since there are further requirements in terms of the acts
performed. The Directive provides that members of the above
units were entitled to privileged P.O.W. status if "captured while
actually engaged in combat or a belligerent act under arms,
other than an act of terrorism,, sabotage, or spying"; 104 or, in
the alternative, such a member "who admits or for whom there
is proof of his having participated or engaged in combat or a
belligerent act under arms other than an act of terrorism, sabo-
tage, or spying."' s Other provisions of the Directive indicate
that a member of one of the listed units who is engaged in "ter-
rorism, sabotage, or spying" would be treated as a "civil de-
fendant," 1°6 and would be entitled to the substantive and pro-
cedural protections of the Civilians Convention. Since the
exceptions of "terrorist" and "sabotage" activities are described
in the Directive as typical "guerrilla" methods,07 the according
of P.O.W. status is not as broad as might appear at first glance.
Terrorism and sabotage are widely regarded as in violation of the
laws and customs of war, and consequently the denial of P.O.W.
status, after determination by the competent tribunal prescribed in
Article 5(2), is consistent with Article 4A(2). In the same way,
the intelligence activities or spying referred to in connection with
the "Secret Self-Defense Force" deprives irregulars of privileged
status in this situation. 108 This U.S. Army Directive which was
101 The relevant portion of this Directive, Annex A, appears in 62 AM. J.
INT'L L. 765 at 766 (1968).
102 Id. at 766-67.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 767. The time factors specified are significant in interpretation of
the Directive.
105 Directive, supra note 101, at 767.
106 Id.
107 Id.
10 id.
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applicable in Vietnam was commended by the representative of
the International Committee of the Red Cross in Saigon as the
first time:
that a government goes far beyond the requirements of the
Geneva [P.O.W.] Convention in an official instruction to its
armed forces . . . . May it be remembered that this light
first shone in the darkness of this tragic war in Vietnam.10 9
The application of Article 4A(1) of the P.O.W. Convention
to regular armed forces is illustrated by Mohamed Ali v. Public
Prosecutor"° decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil in 1968. While a situation of armed conflict existed between
Indonesia and Malaysia, two members of the Indonesian Army
landed in Singapore (then a part of Malaysia) in March 1965,.
in order to commit acts of sabotage. The defendants were wear-
ing civilian clothes when they placed explosives which caused
three civilian deaths in a commercial office building. They were
charged with the crime of murder and the trial court convicted
them in spite of their plea that they were entitled to P.O.W.
status under international law. In dismissing their appeals, it
was held that it was not sufficient for the defendants merely to
show that they were members of regular armed forces, but that
they also had to comply with the four traditional requirements
specified for irregular combatants in the Hague Regulations and
in the P.O.W. Convention. The Privy Council quoted from the
British Government, Manual of Military Law:
Should regqular combatants fail to comply with these four con-
ditions, they may in certain cases become unprivileged belliger-
ents. This would mean that they would not be entitled to the
status of prisoners of war upon their capture.",
Since the defendants carried out acts against non-military targets
which caused civilian deaths, while dressed in civilian clothing,
it is clear that they did not meet the four criteria for the privileged
status of P.O.W.s. If they had been accorded P.O.W. status
initially, they could still have been tried later for violation of the
laws and customs of war. A significant feature of the case is
that. it held the four traditional Brussels-Hague-Geneva criteria,
which are usually applied to irregulars, explicitly applicable to
10,, Quoted in G. PRUGH, LAW AT WAR: VIETNAM 1964-1973, at 66-67 (Dep't
of Army, 1975). See Haight, The Geneva Coniventions in the Shadow WI'ar, 94 U.S.
NAVAL INST. PRoc. 43 (Sept. 1968).
"1 42 INT'L L. REPS. 458 (1971).
Id. at 466. (The emphasis appears in the quotation.)
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regulars. This holding provides support for the conclusion that
the criteria applicable to both groups are identical.
VI. A FUTURE PROJECTION OF THE CRITERIA
FOR IRREGULAR COMBATANTS
At the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of the International Humanitarian Law Ap-
plicable in Armed Conflict the task is to supplement the four
existing Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims. 12
This is to be done through the drafting and, it is hoped, the adop-
tion of Protocol I concerning international armed conflicts and
Protocol II concerning internal conflicts.i13 Consideration is
being given to reducing the criteria applicable to irregular com-
batants as a prerequisite to privileged status upon capture. 4
The first step in such a process, an understanding of the presently
effective law, has been the objective of the present inquiry.
Draft Article 42 of Protocol I, entitled "New category of
prisoners of war," is subject to amendment and then to acceptance
or rejection by the Conference. In its present form it specifies
that the proposed category is in addition to the provisions of
Article 4 of the P.O.W. Convention. It provides for three criteria
in lieu of the four traditional Brussels-Hague-Geneva criteria.
The first draft criterion is responsible military command. The
second, in lieu of distinctive sign and open arms, is "that they
distinguish themselves from the civilian population in military
operations." Professors McDougal and Feliciano and Professor
Baxter have criticized the distinctive sign or uniform as a mean-
ingful basis upon which to decide important rights tis The third
draft criterion is "that they conduct their military operations in
accordance with the [four Geneva] Conventions and with the
present [international conflicts] Protocol." This may ultimately
be a good deal more precise than "the laws and customs of war."
Until the entire Protocol I is adopted by the Conference and be-
comes an agreement in force, however, its scope and meaning
are not known.
112 G.H. Aldrich, Report of the U.S. Delegation to the [)iploimatic Con-
ference on the Reaffirmation and )evelopment of International 1lumanitarian
Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Third Session, (Oct. 15, 1976).
13 Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12,
1949 (Int'l Conmm. of the Red Cross, Geneva 1973).
114 Further recommendations on this subject appear in M. VEUTHEY, GUER-
ILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE 373-78 (1976).
"5 MCl)OUGAL & FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 558-59; Baxter, The .Xhomicipal
and International Lau, Basis of Jurisdiction Over Wt'ar Crimes, 28 BRIT. Y.B. IN'r'L L.
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CASE II'. RES. I. IN'. L.
It may be appropriate to suggest that consideration be given
at the Geneva Diplomatic Conference to sanctions concerning
the law of irregular combatants. Specifically, the humanitarian
purposes of the presently effective or future doctrines cannot be
achieved unless these doctrines are interpreted accurately and
applied consistently and without discrimination.
APPENDIX A
ARTICLE 9 OF THE BRUSSELS DECLARATION(1874)
Art. 9. The laws, rights, and duties of war apply not only to armies,
but also to militia and volunteer corps fulfilling the following conditions:
1. That they be commanded by a person responsible for his subordi-
nates;
2. That they have a fixed distinctive emblem recognizable at a
distance;
3. That they carry arms openly; and
4. That they conduct their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
In countries where militia constitute the army, or form part of it,
they are included under the denomination army.
APPENDIX B
ARTICLE I OF THE HAGUE ANNEXED REGULATIONS
(1899 and 1907)
1899
Annex to the Convention
REGULATIONS RESPECTING
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF WAR ON LAND
SECTION I
ON BELLIGERENTS
CHAPTER I
On The Qualifications
of Belligerents
Article 1. The laws, rights,
and duties of war apply not only
to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. To be commanded by a
person responsible for his subor-
dinates;
1907
.Annex to tie Convention
REGULATIONS RESPECTING
THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS
OF WAR ON LAND
SECTION I
ON BELLIGERENTS
CHAPTER I
The Qualifications
of Belligerents
Article 1. The laws, rights,
and duties of war apply not only
to armies, but also to militia and
volunteer corps fulfilling the fol-
lowing conditions:
1. To be commanded by a
person responsible for his stibor-
dinates;
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2. To have a fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a dis-
tance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their opera-
tions in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
In countries where militia or
volunteer corps constitute the
army, or form part of it, they
are included under the denomi-
nation "army."
2. To have a fixed distinctive
emblem recognizable at a dis-
tance;
3. To carry arms openly; and
4. To conduct their opera-
tions in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
In countries where militia or
volunteer corps constitute the
army, or form part of it, they
are included under the denomi-
nation army.
APPENDIX C
ARTICLE 4A OF THE GENEVA P.O. W. CONVENTION
(1949)
Art. 4.
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present Convention, are
persons belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen
into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well
as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such
armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements, be-
longing to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, pro-
vided that such militias or volunteer corps, including such
organized resistance movements, fulfil the following condi-
tions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, such as civilian members of military
aircraft crews, war correspondents, supply contractors, mem-
bers of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare
of the armed forces, provided that they have received authoriza-
tion from the armed forces which they accompany, who shall
provide them for that purpose with an identity card similar to
the annexed model.
(5) Members of crews, including masters, pilots and apprentices,
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of the merchant marine and the crews of civil aircraft of the
Parties to the conflict, who do not benefit by more favourable
treatment under any other provisions of international law.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach
of the enemy spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading
forces, without having had time to form themselves into regular
armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the
laws and customs of war.
